You know the runaway tram. You probably think the lesson is about what you mean to do. Foot, who invented the tram, thought otherwise. In this film Mr Bad asks you to do seven things, each a worse deed than the last, to save a few people from him. You decide each one. Then the house tells you how she reads it, and where she draws her line. It is not where you think.
The staircase: each step a worse deed. Amber means you did it; a hollow mark means you refused.
You decided the two differently. What's the difference?
Her decisive rule: So .
Four lines up the same staircase: yours, Foot's rule, the intention rule (the one about what you mean to do), and Bentham's. Read each row: where the diamonds stop, that line refuses; where they come back, it allows again. Bentham never stops.
Foot wrote her paper about abortion, and ended it with three medical cases, each with a parallel on the staircase. No Mr Bad here, nothing to win. You decide each one, as a doctor would; then the house tells you what she says.
Elizabeth Anscombe's note "Who is Wronged?" ran straight after the paper, disputing one point: that you must give the medicine to the five. Give the whole bottle to the one who needs it, and who can say you wronged him? Nobody was owed it. If you gave it to the one man, she is on your side.
Seven things Mr Bad asks of you. Decide each one, and find Foot's line.
Who you are. Yourself. Mr Bad has put you where you can save some people from him by doing something to one other person. Seven times. The numbers hardly change; what he asks you to do gets worse each time: turn a wheel, keep a bottle, brew a cure, shut a door, pull a trigger, take up the irons, light a fuse.
What you do. Read what he says. Look at the picture. Tap Do it or Refuse. The film shows what happened.
Then the house speaks. The people along the bottom of the picture watch what you do, and react to it. They don't vote. After each scene they tell you how Philippa Foot reads it: what you would be doing to the one person, what the others would get from you, what kind of conflict that makes, which of her rules decides it, and whether she would have done what you did. Twice, at the brew and at the cave, they also tell you what the rule you probably came in with, the one about what you mean to do, would have done. Mr Bad gets one line.
The step before. Each scene is paired with an earlier one that has the same shape. If you decided the two differently, the house asks you what the difference was, and tells you whether that is the difference Foot names.
The staircase along the top shows where you are and what you did: amber for did it, a hollow mark for refused.
The intermission. The whole staircase with four lines on it: yours, Foot's, the intention rule's, and Bentham's. Then an epilogue: the three cases about abortion the paper was written for. Then the curtain.
Mr Bad asks you to do seven things, each a worse deed than the last, to save a few people from him. You decide each one. After each, the house tells you how Philippa Foot reads it, and where she draws her line. It is not where a reader of the trolley problem expects.
This 1967 paper is where the runaway tram comes from, and in it the tram is the easy case: "we should say, without hesitation, that the driver should steer for the less occupied track". The puzzle is the judge, who could stop a mob from killing five hostages by framing and hanging one innocent man, and may not. Same numbers. Why?
The famous answer is the doctrine of the double effect, which the film calls the intention rule: you may never aim at an innocent death, as your goal or as your means, but you may bring one about as a side effect you only foresee, if the good is great enough. The driver only foresees the one man's death; the judge needs it. Its defenders said that without it we would be "hopelessly in the power of bad men": anyone could make it our duty to kill by threatening to kill more. That is why the film has Mr Bad: he does not follow Bentham's rule, he wants you to, because it is the rule that puts you in his power.
Foot once thought that argument conclusive, and in this paper she replaces it. Her answer: the duty not to harm people is stricter than the duty to help them. So three kinds of conflict, three rules. Harm against harm (the driver: either way his tram kills): do the least harm. Help against help (one bottle, for one or for five): help the most. Harm against help (the judge, the serum, the tyrant's bargain): you may not harm one to help others. Letting someone die so that he dies (the beggar, left to starve for his body) counts as harm. And where the one is lost either way (the man stuck in the cave), there is no conflict at all.
The two rules agree on every familiar case. So Foot builds one that splits them: five patients can be saved by making a gas that will also send lethal fumes into the room of a sixth, who cannot be moved. His death is no use to anyone, a side effect, so the intention rule allows it. It is harm done to help others, so hers forbids it. "Yet it surely is different" from the scarce drug, she says, and the relatives would win if they sued. That is the brew. Her conclusion: what you aim at "plays only a quite subsidiary role in determining what we say in these cases, while the distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is very important indeed." And rejecting the intention rule does not leave us counting lives.
The film keeps the numbers nearly fixed and makes the deed worse at every step: turn a wheel, keep a bottle, brew a cure, shut a door, pull a trigger, take up the irons, light a fuse. The order is ours; the cases are hers (the tram, the scarce drug, the gas, the beggar, the judge as a private bargain, the tyrant's torture, the cave). The point of the staircase is that her line does not climb with it: she allows the first two, forbids the next four, and allows the last, which is the worst deed of all. The intention rule allows the first three and forbids the rest. Bentham's rule, counting lives and nothing else, does everything he asks.
The numbers: five against one for the tram, the medicine, the brew and the bargain, as in the paper; two for the irons (her "mad murderer" who makes it our duty to kill one "to prevent him from killing two"); three for the beggar (the serum saves "several"); eight for the cave (the paper's party is uncounted). Within each pair the numbers are the same, so the numbers can never be the difference.
Foot argues in pairs: two cases with the same numbers and different verdicts, and a question: what is the difference? The film keeps her pairs as the house's first remark on each step: the medicine against the tram, the brew against the medicine (her own question, "why then is the case different from that of the scarce drug?"), the beggar against the medicine, the bargain against the tram (her driver and judge), the irons against the bargain, the cave against the bargain. When you decided the two differently, the house asks you to name the difference and tells you whether it is the one she names.
The people along the bottom of the picture are the paper's "we": "we should say, without hesitation"; "most of us would be appalled"; "yet it surely is different"; "most reasonable men". They do not vote and they do not split. They watch, and they react to what you do: a stir at the wheel, horror that grows from the brew to the irons when the deed is done, a flinch at the cave and then stillness, quiet when you refuse. Afterwards they tell you what she says. The film does not report what most people would do: the paper claims it, in those hedged phrases, and does not test it, and a large experimental literature on cases like these has grown up since. The house's reactions are our staging of her claims, not data.
Foot's real subject was abortion. The intention rule was used to allow some operations that kill a fetus (removing a cancerous womb) and forbid others (crushing the skull), even to save the mother. She ends with three medical cases and finds each a parallel among adults: mother and child both die unless the child is killed (the cave: no real conflict, so act, "whatever the method used"); either can be saved but not both (the shipwreck: only a question of whom to save); and the worst, where killing the child saves the mother but doing nothing saves the child (the intention rule forbids it, and Foot thinks the verdict may be right for the wrong reason, since "in general we do not think that we can kill one innocent person to rescue another"). She ends without a verdict: "I have not been arguing for or against these points of view but only trying to discern some of the currents that are pulling us back and forth." The epilogue plays the three cases as she lists them.
Elizabeth Anscombe's note "Who is Wronged?" ran straight after the paper. She disputes one point: that you must give the scarce drug to the five. If you give the whole dose to the one who needs it, who can say you wronged him? Nobody was owed it.
The paper has no data and no model; it has cases, two principles and the verdicts "we" give. The game describes each case by the features her argument uses (is the harm aimed at or only foreseen; is it harm done or help withheld; is it set against harm you would do or help you would give; would the one suffer anyway) and runs her rule and the intention rule on them. Every verdict the house reports is tagged in the source to the sentence it comes from.
In the paper only the tyrant is a bad man; here Mr Bad poisons the patients, cuts the tram's brakes, holds the hostages and floods the cave. Foot treats stopping someone else's harm as help, so the cases keep their shape. The bargain is her judge with the court taken out, as she takes it out herself ("some private individual"). In the cave you hold the dynamite outside, with the party trapped behind the stuck man (in the paper the trapped party do the blasting, and the stuck man is "the fat man"). The irons are her tyrant's torture, with his mad murderer's number. Left out: the foothold (the man on the branch might cling on and survive, while the judge's victim must be made to die), which she sets aside; the poisoners and the gravediggers; the line between strict duties and charity.
Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect", Oxford Review 5 (1967): 5–15; reprinted in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (1978). No DOI. Record: philpapers.org/rec/FOOTPO-2. With G. E. M. Anscombe, "Who is Wronged? Philippa Foot on Double Effect: One Point", Oxford Review 5 (1967): 16–17.
Game built from this paper; the paper is the authority where the two disagree.
Type: Limelight by Nicole Fally and Libre Baskerville by Pablo Impallari, both under the SIL Open Font License, embedded.