kreuder-sonnen
schmotz
zürn
The world's rulebooks overlap: a bank's, a court's, an agency's. Where two of them say opposite things, they clash.
Nine times, you speak for an old international body (orange) whose rules clash with another's (green). You see how the clash began, choose how many pages of your rulebook to rewrite to meet them, and watch them answer.
Each game deals nine clashes from a pile of fourteen. Deal a different deck.
Each page you rewrite turns one orange stripe green: that bit of the overlap goes their way. Pages you give are gone, deal or no deal.
The paper's own cases: the World Bank and the UN's human-rights office (an accident, settled); the energy agencies IEA and IRENA (started on purpose, settled); Israel and the US against the refugee agency UNRWA, citing the rules of another, UNHCR (started on purpose, fought to the end). The clashes you played are made up, in their shapes.
Nine times, an old international body's rules clash with another body's. You choose how many pages of your rulebook to rewrite to meet them, out of fourteen for the whole game. Some clashes began by accident, some were started on purpose; the other side answers accordingly, and the crowd sometimes takes a side.
Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, Alexander Schmotz and Michael Zürn study interface conflicts: open disagreements between actors about which of two overlapping international rules should prevail. Scholars of “regime complexity” (the thicket of overlapping international institutions) had split into pessimists, for whom overlap lets states play institutions against each other and fragments global governance, and optimists, for whom it brings flexibility and, in time, a division of labour. The paper argues that both are right about different conflicts, and that what decides is the conflict's origin.
A non-instrumental conflict arises by accident, when a new event or issue meets two institutions with different jobs (their example: the World Bank, whose charter bars politics from its loans, against the UN's human-rights office, over the rights of people affected by its projects). Its parties also value what the institutions provide, so they tend to compromise, and cooperative management tends to knit the institutions closer (the Bank now reads its charter as requiring human-rights checks). An instrumental conflict is created on purpose, by an actor who wants to challenge an institution and invokes another institution's rules against it (their examples: the African Union against the UN Security Council over Libya in 2011; Israel and the United States against the refugee agency UNRWA from 2017, citing the refugee definition of UNHCR). At least one side takes a position the other cannot accept, so management tends to be non-cooperative, “at least initially”, and non-cooperative management tends to fragment the order.
They test this with a cluster analysis of the 77 conflicts in the Interface Conflicts 2.0 Dataset (starting 1970–2018). Three groups appear. Benign: 35 accidental conflicts, 33 managed cooperatively, 25 of 34 integrative. Malign: 16 deliberate conflicts, none managed cooperatively, 15 fragmenting. And a group their baseline did not predict, hybrid: 26 deliberate conflicts, all managed cooperatively in the end, 20 integrative. Adding three rival explanations (whether the conflict was about interests or values, whether it crossed spheres of authority, whether gains were shared) leaves the three groups standing. Case studies follow one conflict from each group: UNRWA and UNHCR's rules (malign: no agreement), the energy agencies IEA and IRENA (hybrid: IRENA was founded in 2009 to challenge the IEA's focus on oil; after early mistrust the IEA upgraded its renewables work, and the two signed a partnership in 2012 and a memorandum in 2019), and investment law against indigenous land rights in Zimbabwe (benign, but messy). Their explanation of the hybrid case: IRENA's cause won over a wider public, so the IEA faced a legitimacy crisis if it kept resisting; they call the conditions for this path a question for further research.
This game demonstrates, under its own assumptions, how the paper's argument can work: the other side's behaviour follows from how the clash began, so the same goodwill settles an accident cheaply, is wasted on a challenger who wants your body gone, and pays off with a challenger whose cause has the crowd behind it. A player who behaves as the paper's actors do (meets accidents at once, holds against a challenge first, gives way if the crowd backs the challenger) reproduces the paper's counts: about 45 per cent of clashes accidental, 78 per cent settled cooperatively (paper 77), 61 per cent knitting the bodies closer (paper 61), and the three groups in proportion.
It assumes (all ours): that cooperation has a price, counted in pages of your rulebook, and a purse of fourteen for the game; the prices (an accident one page, the messy one two, a popular challenger two, a challenger who wants your body gone no price at all); that an accident met with nothing digs in and costs a page more; that the crowd, after a first offer that settles nothing, backs a popular challenger and costs you pages if you hold out (our reading of the IEA's “legitimacy crisis”), and backs you against a hostile one (as the UN General Assembly backed UNRWA). The crowd is generalised from one case each; in the game it is the whole of the hybrid path, which the paper does not claim. The clashes are made up, each in the shape of a kind of case in the paper; the paper's real cases are named on the end screen and here. Each deck holds four accidents (one messy), three popular challenges and two hostile ones: the paper's 35 : 26 : 16 in nine. Two offers stand for what took years. The paper's two accidental conflicts that were managed non-cooperatively anyway are left out: here an accident met with its price always settles. What happens years later is drawn with the paper's rates: a deal knits about three times in four, a stand-off tears fifteen times in sixteen. Every number sits in the config block at the top of the source, with its source.
The paper establishes the three groups in its 77 coded conflicts and, through three case studies, the sequence from origin to management to effect. It says cluster analysis does not test causes, that its sample was not drawn at random, and that motives are hard to see and often mixed. The game's settlements, crowds and pages are no evidence for its claims.
Two small inconsistencies in the paper, for the record: its conclusion says roughly two-thirds of deliberate conflicts are malign and one-third hybrid, while its figures give 16 malign and 26 hybrid (the game follows the figures); and its Table 1 counts for “interests” and “across spheres” look swapped against its Figure 6. The game uses neither of those two variables.
The extended variables (interests or values; within or across spheres of authority, where the paper finds hybrid conflicts mostly cross spheres and calls it a puzzle; symmetric or lopsided gains); third parties such as arbitrators and the UN Secretary-General; the dendrograms and the clustering method itself (agglomerative hierarchical clustering on Gower distances, Ward linkage).
Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, Alexander Schmotz and Michael Zürn, “The complex effects of regime complexity: a conflict model”, European Journal of International Relations 32(2) (2026): 611–638, published online 2025. doi.org/10.1177/13540661251368630. Open access. The dataset: Zürn, Kreuder-Sonnen and Fuß (2024), Interface Conflicts 2.0, GESIS, doi 10.7802/2716.
Game built from this paper; the paper is the authority where the two disagree. A beta: it has had the builder's review only and has not been played by real strangers. Randomness: which clashes are dealt and in what order, and what happens years later, both fixed by the deck number. Font: Archivo, SIL Open Font License.