One Number, Please
From: a journalist  ·  To: the lab  ·  Subject: quick question
“Are women less competitive than men? I need one number by Friday.”

You run a lab in Rome where students come to play for money. Before each session you tick two things on the screen they will see: what they must do to compete, and what they can win. Then you press Run, watch the room fill, and read the two bars that come out, one for the men and one for the women. Eight sessions, then you write back.

Find out, in eight lab sessions, whether women are less competitive than men, and write back.

A beta, built from the paper. Builder's review only; the author finishes it.
Session 1 of 8 — Apparatus

Find out, in eight lab sessions, whether women are less competitive than men, and write back.

Each session: 24 students, in groups of four, two men and two women. The students never change between sessions. Only what you put on their screen does.

To compete, the students must:
solve as many sums as they can in five minuteswhoever solves the most of their four wins
name a price for the jobwhoever offers to pay the most of their four gets it
What they can win (in ECU, the lab's money; 10 ECU is a euro):
one winner takes 350; the other three get 50
a flat ladder: 350 for the top job, 200 for each of two middle jobs, 50 for the one left over
a steep ladder: 450 for the top job, 150 for each of two middle jobs, 50 for the one left over

Six ways to set the screen, eight sessions. One session of 24 is noisy; repeat the ones you want to believe.

Budget left: €2,400 · a session costs €300
What the students will see

Tick both boxes above; the screen fills in as you do.

Notebook

Σ sums · € price · the boxes are the prizes · ■ men ■ women, how hard they went for the top

Reply to the email
From: a journalist  ·  Subject: quick question
“Are women less competitive than men? I need one number by Friday.”

Your eight sessions are in the notebook below. Write back one sentence. The notebook will be read against it.

Dear journalist,
Yes. Women are less competitive than men.
No. Women are as competitive as men, if anything more.
It depends on what you make them do to compete.
Notebook
Sent

You wrote back:

What your lab found

What the paper found

Three economists ran the price apparatus in Rome: 168 students, a flat firm and a steep one, 32 rounds each. The women bid as high as the men; for the top of the flat firm a few points higher. The women got the top job more often than their share. Nobody earned more for being at the top: the middle jobs paid better. The famous gap comes from labs where competing means a race at sums; this one measures something else, the willingness to pay for rank, and finds no gap in it.

Rome, flat firm: bid for the top job, for every 100 it is worth

Men
Women

Their own sentence, near enough: neither way of measuring is the better one; they measure different things, and what you infer about women and competition depends on which you chose.

Lab seed · the same seed gives the same students
A beta, built from the paper. Builder's review only; the author finishes it.
How to play

Find out, in eight lab sessions, whether women are less competitive than men, and write back.

The lab. Each session, 24 students come in and sit in groups of four: two men, two women. They play once for the lab's money, ECU (10 ECU is a euro). The students are the same kind of people every session. Only their screen changes, and you write it.

Your two choices. In the Apparatus window, tick what the students must do to compete: solve sums (whoever solves the most of their four wins; a student may also sit out for a sure amount) or name a price (each student writes the most they would pay for a job; the highest offer gets it and pays the second-highest). Then tick what they can win: one winner (350, the rest 50), a flat ladder (350, 200, 200, 50) or a steep ladder (450, 150, 150, 50). Both boxes start empty every session. The window below, What the students will see, fills in as you tick, so you can read their screen before you run it.

Run. Press Run session. The room fills, the clock runs, and a Result window opens with two bars: how hard the men went for the top, and how hard the women did. Under sums, the bar is the share who chose to compete. Under price, it is what they offered for the top job, out of every 100 it is worth. Then: who got the six top jobs, what the two groups took home, and a line on what this apparatus actually measured. When the apparatus is the one the paper ran, the paper's own result is shown in grey underneath. Press Write it in the notebook to keep the row.

The notebook. One row per session: Σ for sums, € for price, the prize boxes, the two bars small, and the result in words. There are six ways to set the screen and eight sessions. One session of 24 is noisy; a result worth believing is one you have seen twice, and when you run an apparatus again the result window says what the sessions say together.

Write back. After the eighth session, pick one sentence for the journalist. The game reads your notebook against it and says whether your own sessions back what you sent, then shows what the paper found.

About

The paper. Andrej Angelovski, Jordi Brandts and Werner Güth (2026), Bidding for better jobs: an experiment on gender differences in competitiveness without a real-effort task, Theory and Decision, doi:10.1007/s11238-026-10132-9. Open access. Game built from this paper; the paper is the authority where the two disagree.

What the paper found

Most lab evidence that women compete less comes from one kind of experiment: a few minutes of a task, winner takes all. The authors ask whether that is competing as a career knows it, where getting ahead means spending money, time and effort to secure a rank. So they made competing a sealed bid: 168 students in Rome bid, 32 times each, for a top job and two middle jobs in a flat firm (350 / 200 / 200, default 50) and a steep one (450 / 150 / 150, default 50), first inside groups of four and then across eight. The bids of women and men did not differ significantly; women bid a few points higher for the top of the flat firm. Women ended up in the top job more often than their share. Nobody earned more for being at the top: the middle jobs paid better. Their conclusion is not that women are more competitive, but that what you infer about gender and competition depends on how you measure competing, and that neither way is the right one.

The game

You are the experimenter. The paper's whole point is a design decision its authors made, so the game hands you that decision as a switch: what competing means on the students' screen (a race at sums, or a price for the job) and what they can win (one winner, a flat ladder, a steep ladder). Eight sessions of 24 students; two bars each; a notebook; a sentence back to the journalist. The students never change between sessions, so whatever moves in the bars was moved by the apparatus.

What is under the hood

The price apparatus is reconstructed from the paper. Each student's bid for a rung is the rational benchmark (the salary less the 50 everyone gets anyway) plus a deviation drawn to match the paper's Figure 4 and Table 1 (bids for the top about 40 ECU under the benchmark, women about 14 higher in the flat firm; bids for the middle near the benchmark), with the bunching at the benchmark the paper's appendix describes. The paper's own allocation rules then run: the top job to the highest bidder at the second-highest bid, the middle jobs to the next two at the third's. The reconstruction reproduces, to within the tolerances in the calibration file, the paper's bid deviations, the share of top jobs won by women, the earnings by position and the absence of a gender difference in earnings.

The sums apparatus is reconstructed from the literature the paper argues with, as the paper's introduction and section 2 describe it: Niederle and Vesterlund's 2007 lab, where about three in four men and one in three women chose the tournament, men and women performed alike, and the gap went with beliefs about one's own rank and attitudes to risk. Each student here has an ability, a private view of their standing (men's more flattering), an aversion to a gamble (women's stronger), and a taste for the top that does not differ by gender, which is the paper's finding. A student competes when the prize they expect under their own view, less their aversion times the spread, beats the sure alternative. None of these numbers is the paper's data.

Two cells are ours alone. The paper never ran a sums contest with its prize ladders; those cells cross the two switches so the player can test either on its own. In this model a ladder barely moves the gap, because a view of one's own rank still decides who competes. And the one-job price cell is a second-price auction for a single job, with no gender difference, as the auction literature the paper cites reports for that rule.

Claim boundaries

  • What the game demonstrates: that the same students, measured two ways, can show a large gap one way and none the other; and that in the price apparatus women reach the top at least as often and nobody earns more for it.
  • What the game assumes: that the sums gap comes from confidence and nerve rather than from wanting the top (the decomposition is ours; the central contrast survives either extreme, as the calibration file shows); the shape of every individual-level distribution; that a session is one shot, not 32 rounds; two men and two women in every group; the words that turn a difference into "about the same" or "about twice as often".
  • What the paper establishes: the bid, top-job and earnings patterns of its own 168 students in its own design, and the argument that inferences about gender and competitiveness are sensitive to the measurement context. It does not establish why the real-effort gap arises, and it says its results have nothing to say about discrimination or other obstacles on the demand side.

Divergences from the paper

  • The email, the budget and the eight sessions are ours. The session cost is the paper's average earnings of about 12 euro times 24, rounded.
  • One session is six groups of four, one period; the paper's steady-state bids (from period 4 on) are the target.
  • Phase 2 of the paper, with eight bidders across both firms, is not played; its results (lower earnings for everyone, women more often on top) appear in the grey line only.
  • The sums bar counts who chose to compete; the price bar is a bid as a share of the rung's worth. They sit on the same scale with different captions, and never measured the same thing, which is the paper's point.

Mechanism kind: reconstructed (price apparatus, from the paper); reconstructed from the paper's literature (sums apparatus); toy (the two crossed cells and the one-job price cell). Every number is in the config block at the top of the mechanism, tagged with its source, and the calibration check is in the repository.

Fonts: Liberation Sans (Red Hat, SIL Open Font License), the free Arial, because that is what the paper's screens were set in. A beta, built from the paper. Builder's review only; the author finishes it.