paper-to-game

Design memo — The Balance

1. Paper

Ingela Alger and Jörgen W. Weibull (2013), “Homo Moralis — Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching.” Econometrica 81(6):2269–2302. doi:10.3982/ECTA10637. Only the PDF was available; there was no code. Everything is derived from the paper’s equations.

2. What the paper hands over

Primary: a model, ported. People are matched in pairs to play a symmetric game, and each person’s preferences are private. Matching may be assortative, which the paper summarises in one number: the index of assortativity σ, the limiting chance that a rare mutant meets its own kind (eqs. 4–6). Homo moralis has utility u_κ(x,y) = (1−κ)π(x,y) + κπ(x,x) (eq. 7). The fitness of residents and mutants is given by eqs. 11–12, and equilibrium by eq. 3. Theorem 1: homo moralis with κ = σ (“homo hamiltonensis”) resists every mutant that behaves differently, and any type that behaves differently from it is invaded when the type space is rich.

Secondary: the paper’s own worked examples, which hand over concrete games and concrete σ:

3. The discovery, and its kind

A counterintuitive result.

Both parts follow from the model, not from our rules. The game’s yardstick, the number of newcomers that out-earn the residents, is the paper’s own invasion criterion (Definition 2) applied to a grid of mutants. Section 15(f) checks that the result does not depend on our payoff numbers.

4. The core narrative

A village of people who all think alike has to decide how much to care about others. People who only look after themselves do well when they deal with strangers, because nobody pays them back for being kind. But when people mostly deal with family, who think like they do, being kind comes back to you. Newcomers keep arriving who care a little more or a little less. The surprise: the village that no newcomer can push out is not the selfish one, and not the saintly one, but the one that cares exactly as much as the chance of dealing with its own kind — and that stays true whatever they are dealing over.

5. Fidelity level and claim boundaries

Structural.

In-game prose says “in this model”.

6. The aim and the verdict

7. Concepts

The playable experience was not obvious, so there are three concepts.

A. Evolution’s hand (strategic; Controller).

B. The mutant (strategic; Agent).

C. The preference itself (discovery; non-obvious agent).

8. The first five minutes (pick A)

9. The pick, and why

A. It replays Theorem 1’s own structure, a resident against mutants. The discovery lands in society 2 through the player’s own failed tests, and the player then uses it twice in prediction rounds.

Runner-up: C, a second pass on conditional morality. Switch to C if the author wants the game to be about one person being moral in some places and not others.

10. The shape

Five societies, about five to six minutes (an estimate; not timed by a person).

Mode Societies Rule
Find it Strangers (σ 0, public good, Section 2.1 / Example 1), Siblings (σ ½, public good, Section 5.1), Siblings with a different deal (σ ½, hawk–dove, Section 4) Test as often as needed. After three failed tests the player may ask to see the answer.
Predict it Half-siblings (σ ¼, hawk–dove, fn. 24), Classmates (σ ≈ 0.20, PD (7,5,3,2), Section 5.2 and Fig. 1) One test.

Order: strangers come first because the lay intuition is “goodness is safe”, so strangers is a discovery in its own right. It also sets up the siblings reversal, which arrives within two minutes.

There is no running score. The yardstick is per test (“beaten by n of 11”; 0 = held), the verdict is per round (found on test k / prediction held), and the session verdict comes at the end.

11. Controls, mechanism, feedback, moment

12. What is cut

13. Divergences

14. Visual world

A natural-history specimen plate, because the paper names species (oeconomicus, kantiensis, moralis, hamiltonensis). The look: cream paper, sepia ink, italic Latin binomials.

Rules:

  1. Two inks only, iron-red for own gain and indigo for the right thing; every figure is tinted by its balance.
  2. The control is a brass scale that tilts.
  3. Few, big things. The play screen shows one scale, one village bar, two large figures with their earnings, and one ruler.
  4. Legibility. The scale answers “what did I set?”. The bar answers “is the newcomer winning?”. The earnings answer “why?”. The drawer answers “which way should I move?”.

15. Fidelity plan

Run node fidelity.js against mechanism.js, the only copy:

16. Fidelity result and build log

Result (fidelity-result.txt): ALL CHECKS PASS.

Build log: